DA PAM Risk Analysis for Army Property [United States Department of the Army] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. The United. DA PAM – Risk Analysis for Army Property. This revision–. o Clarifies and simplifies procedural aspects of the risk analysis procedure (para ). Da Pam by United States Department of the Army, , available at Book Depository with free delivery worldwide.
|Published (Last):||4 August 2004|
|PDF File Size:||1.42 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||1.11 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Da Pam : United States Department of the Army :
Commanders must ensure that appropriate physical-security measures are taken to minimize the loss of personnel, supplies, equipment, and material through both human and natural threats.
Psm force-protection officer must coordinate with several different agencies to complete his mission. For example, the Army’s Intelligence and Counterintelligence Program see Appendix C provides information that will be used to complete the unit’s crisis-management plan see Appendix D. The approach to developing protective measures for assets should be based on a systematic process resulting in an integrated protective system. The protective system focuses on protecting specific assets against well-defined threats to acceptable levels of protection.
The system is organized psm and contains mutually supporting elements coordinated to prevent gaps or overlaps in responsibilities and performance. Effective protective systems integrate the following mutually supporting elements:. The following determinations are made when considering system-development procedures:. The key to applying these tools successfully is to use a team approach. A team may include physical-security, intelligence, and operations personnel; the installation engineers; and the 190-551 of the assets.
It may also include representatives from the multinational, host-nation HNand local police as well as the regional security office from the ad. Protective systems should always be developed for specific assets.
The goal of security is to protect facilities and buildings and the assets contained inside. The risk-analysis procedure in DA Pam is used to identify assets.
It represents the majority of assets with which DOD is commonly 19051. These factors are assessed by answering a series of questions leading to value and likelihood ratings.
Da Pam 190-51 : Risk Analysis for Army Property
Asset value is determined by considering the following three elements:. The relative value differs for each asset. For some assets, dda relative value is measured in terms of monetary cost. The likelihood of the threat is assessed for each applicable aggressor category by considering the asset’s value to the aggressor, the history of or potential for aggressors attempting to compromise the asset, and the vulnerability of the asset based on existing or planned protective measures. The risk level is the basis for determining the required protective measures for assets covered in AR For each asset type, there may be physical protective measures, procedural security measures, and terrorism counteraction measures.
These measures are specified by risk level. The measures identified in AR are the minimum regulatory measures that must be applied for the identified threat level.
In accordance with DOD Instruction These construction standards have specific requirements for such measures ea standoff distance, perimeter barriers, building construction, and parking. The DOD construction standard provides for minimum standards that must be incorporated into all inhabited DOD structures regardless of the identified threat. These standards provide a degree of protection that will not preclude the direct effects of blast but will minimize collateral damage for buildings and people and will limit the progressive collapse of structures.
Dw standards add relatively little cost, may facilitate future upgrades, and may deter acts of aggression. Protection to identified threat levels is described in the following paragraphs.
The threat must be described in specific terms to help determine the assets’ vulnerabilities or to establish protective measures. This description should include the tactics that aggressors will use to compromise the asset weapons, tools, and explosives are likely 10-51 be used in an attempt. For example, the threat might be described as a moving vehicle bomb pwm of a 4,pound vehicle containing a pound explosive.
Another example would be a forced-entry threat using specific hand, power, or thermal tools. These types 19051 threat descriptions called the design-basis threat can be used to design detailed protective systems to mitigate the attacks. TM and DA Pam contain procedures sa establishing design-basis threat descriptions in the 10-51 described above. These procedures can be used together or separately.
Threats listed in the TM will be summarized later in this chapter.
COMMAND INSPECTION CHECKLIST
When using the TM as a lone source or in conjunction with DA Dsthe following actions occur:. The level of protection applies to the design of a protective system against a specified threat for example, a bomb, breaking and entering, pilfering, and so forth.
The level of protection is based on the asset’s value rating from either DA Pam or TM The level increases as the asset’s value rating increases. There pqm separate levels of protection for each tactic.
TM provides detailed guidance on how to achieve pzm levels of protection, and Chapter 3 of this manual provides a summary of the levels of protection as they apply to various tactics.
Vulnerabilities are gaps pxm the assets’ protection. They are identified by considering the tactics associated with the threat and the levels of protection that are associated with those tactics. Some vulnerabilities can be identified by considering the general design strategies for each tactic described in TM and as summarized in Chapter 3 of this manual.
The general design strategies identify the basic approach to protecting assets against specific tactics. For example, the general design strategy for forced entry is to provide a way to detect attempted intrusion and to provide barriers to delay the aggressors until a response force arrives. Vulnerabilities may involve inadequacies in intrusion-detection systems IDSs and barriers.
Similarly, the general design strategy for a moving vehicle bomb is to keep the vehicle as far from the facility as possible and to harden the facility to resist the explosive at that distance.
Vulnerabilities may involve limited standoff distances, inadequate barriers, and building construction that cannot resist explosive effects at the applicable standoff distance.
Where vulnerabilities have been identified, protective measures must be identified to mitigate them. The key to effective development of protective systems is a partnership between physical-security personnel and the installation engineers.
Appendix E of this manual discusses information for office security, which should be listed in the physical-security plan see Appendix F. Appendix G discusses personal-protection measures. Protective systems integrate physical protective dda and security procedures to protect assets against a design-basis threat. The characteristics of integrated systems include deterrence, detection, defense, and defeat.
A potential aggressor who perceives a risk of being caught may be deterred from attacking an asset. The effectiveness of deterrence varies with the aggressor’s sophistication, the asset’s attractiveness, and the aggressor’s objective. Although deterrence is not considered a direct design objective, it may be a result of the design. A detection measure senses an act of aggression, assesses the validity of the detection, and communicates 190-15 appropriate information to apm response force.
A detection system must provide all three of these capabilities to be effective. Detection measures may detect an aggressor’s movement via an IDS, or they may detect weapons d tools via X-ray machines or metal and explosive detectors.
Detection measures may also include access-control elements that assess the validity of identification ID credentials. These control elements may provide a programmed response admission or denialor they may relay information to d response force. Guards serve as detection elements, detecting intrusions and controlling access. Nuclear, biological, and chemical NBC detection systems must be used to 19051 and validate acts of aggression involving WMD. NBC detection systems should also be used to communicate a warning.
Defensive measures protect an asset from aggression by delaying or preventing an ad movement toward the asset or by shielding the pak from weapons and explosives.
Defensive measures may be active or passive. Active defensive measures are manually or pa, activated in response to acts of aggression. Passive defensive measures do not depend on detection or a response. They include such measures as dda building components and fences. Guards may also be considered as a defensive measure. Most protective systems depend on response personnel to defeat an aggressor. Although defeat is not a design objective, defensive and detection systems must be designed to accommodate or at least not interfere with response-force activities.
Security threats are acts or conditions that may result in the compromise of sensitive information; loss of dq damage, loss, or destruction of property; or disruption of mission. Physical-security personnel and design teams 1900-51 understand the threat to the assets they are to protect in order to develop effective security programs or design security systems.
Historical patterns and trends in aggressor activity indicate general categories of aggressors and the common tactics they use against military assets. Aggressor tactics and their associated tools, weapons, and explosives are the basis for the threat to assets.
There are many potential sources of threat information. Threat assessment is normally a military-intelligence MI responsibility. MI personnel commonly focus on such security threats as terrorists and military forces. Coordinating with these elements on a regular basis is essential to maintaining an effective security program.
Security threats are classified as either human or natural. Human threats are carried out by a wide range of aggressors who may have one or more objectives toward assets such as equipment, personnel, and operations. Aggressors can be categorized and their objectives can be generalized as described below.
Four major objectives describe an aggressor’s behavior. Any one of the first three objectives can be used to realize the fourth. Hostile acts performed by these aggressors range from crimes such as burglary to low-intensity conflict threats such as unconventional warfare. Each of these categories describes predictable aggressors who pose threats to military assets and who share common objectives and tactics. Natural threats are usually the consequence of natural phenomena.
They are not preventable by physical-security measures, but they are likely to have significant effects on security systems and operations. They may require an increase in protective measures either to address new situations or to compensate for the loss of existing security measures. They may reduce the effectiveness of existing security measures by such occurrences as collapsed perimeter fences and barriers, inoperable protective lighting, damaged patrol vehicles, and poor visibility.
Natural threats and their effects relative to security include the following:. Aggressors have historically used a wide range of offensive strategies reflecting their capabilities and objectives. These offensive strategies are categorized into 15 tactics that are specific methods of achieving aggressor goals see TM